CHAPTER 3

IN THE LAND OF SAND AND OIL: HOW THE MACROFOUNDATIONS OF A TRIBAL SOCIETY SHAPE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

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ABSTRACT

Research on institutional logics has missed the opportunity to understand how and why societies may fundamentally differ in their material and symbolic systems. In this chapter, the authors offer a qualitative examination of the implementation of infrastructure public–private partnership (PPP) projects in the Arab state of Qatar. The authors illustrate how the macrofoundations of Qatari society are rooted in the notion of tribe, an inter-institutional system under which the intertwined institutional orders of the state, the market, and the family have historically developed and operated. Our study sheds light on how these macrofoundations shape the processes and mechanisms that underpin the resistance to the introduction of innovative organizational forms. The chapter makes two contributions. First, it identifies how "foreign" organizational forms rooted in Western institutional orders trigger adverse reactions from societies characterized by different institutional orders. Second, it demonstrates the challenge

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of implementing PPPs in an institutional context that is un*favorable to them and where actors seek to preserve the supremacy of the extant inter-institutional system.*

Keywords: Public–private partnerships; institutional orders; macrofoundations of institutions; tribal societies; Qatar; infrastructure

INTRODUCTION

Institutional theory has predominantly focused on Western contexts, where capitalist systems reinforce the institutional order of the market as a central pillar of society (Fairclough & Micelotta, 2013; Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Greve & Man Zhang, 2017; Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008). This chapter revisits Friedland and Alford's (1991) concept of institutional orders, which places individual and collective actions within an overarching *inter-institutional* system that governs a society, to extend it to a non-Western society (i.e., Qatar). Institutional orders encompass a multitude of constructs, such as family, market, and state, and each of these constructs is defined by "a central logic – a set of material practices and symbolic constructions – which constitute its organizing principles" (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 248). Importantly, we theorize institutional orders as key macrofoundations of society that shape the context for individual and collective action. We build on this concept to shed light on the processes and mechanisms that underpin the adoption of innovative organizational forms (i.e., public–private partnerships (PPPs)) in a non-Western context.

Thus far, an extensive body of research has analyzed how institutional orders "affect organizational strategies, structures, and practices" (McPherson & Sauder, 2013, p. 166). What remains unclear is how these institutional orders affect organizational fields in non-Western contexts (Fairclough & Micelotta, 2013; Greenwood, Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010). In particular, we believe that it is particularly important to explore the influence of non-market institutional orders such as the community, family, and state in these contexts, because their conceptualization was originally constructed – and continues to be based on – the tenets of Western societies, where capitalist market dynamics have predominantly shaped policy-making (Greenwood et al., 2011; Micelotta, Lounsbury, & Greenwood, 2017).

This chapter explores how the macrofoundations of a non-Western society shape the adoption and implementation of an organization form associated with and undergirded by Western logics. We unpack how actors and organizations whose actions are shaped by culturally distinctive institutional orders may strike a balance between their conflicting interests and collaborate to deliver services.

Specifically, we focus on PPPs, defined as long-term contracts between governmental actors and private actors, based on a delegation of responsibilities related to the construction, ownership, and management of an infrastructure project. PPPs have traditionally been studied within Anglo-Saxon contexts in "a positive and apparently non-ideological language" (Angerer & Hammerschmid, 2005, p. 133). Nevertheless, the implementation of PPPs beyond their Anglo-Saxon birthplace to the wider context of non-Western developing countries shows that these organizational forms might fail or "be ineffectively implemented, if they are inconsistent with the core values of local settings," where similar beliefs in market supremacy or partnership might not exist (Common, 2000, p. 137; Pollitt, 2015). Therefore, the central research question that guides our study is: *How do the macrofoundations (i.e., societal-level institutional orders) in a non-Western setting affect the adoption and implementation of a "foreign" organization form (i.e., infrastructure PPPs)?*

We examine the Arab Gulf country of Qatar as an appropriate empirical context to study the contested adoption of PPPs. Management research about the Arab region is scarce and very little is known about how organizational forms, such as PPPs, are formulated and implemented (Thompson & Quilliam, 2018, p. 126). In Qatar, the adoption of PPPs has been very selective and exclusively limited to a handful of projects in the sectors of water desalination and power generation (Biygautane, 2017). Research in cognate disciplines reveals that societal orders such as the family play a considerable role in economic planning and policy-making in these regions (Kamrava, 2017). Like other countries in the Middle East, Qatar remains a fundamentally tribal society, where the tribe is a key socio-political structure (Makki, 2011). The examination of Qatar, therefore, offers a great opportunity to shed light on how the macrofoundations of society in a non-Western context shape the processes and mechanisms that underpin the adoption of PPPs.

The theoretical contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, by expanding the empirical examination of institutional orders beyond the Western context, we emphasize the important role that macrofoundations play in shaping individual and collective action. Specifically, we reveal how and why "foreign" organizational forms trigger adverse reactions in societies rooted in a different inter-institutional system. Second, it advances current theorization in PPP research, by broadening its analytical scope to encompass the wider societal dynamics that affect their differential adoption and implementation in various contexts. The study shows how and why the state of Qatar purposefully maintains an institutional field that is *un*favorable to PPPs to preserve the supremacy of extant institutional orders.

We begin by developing a theoretical framework that combines insights from the institutional literature with sociological studies of the tribes of the Gulf region to delineate the unique features of institutional orders in non-Western societies. This is followed by a brief review of the PPP literature and the factors associated with the successful implementation of these projects. The methodology section then describes the research context, the justification for adopting a case study approach, and the methods of data collection and analysis. The findings section articulates how the institutional orders of the family, state, and market are uniquely intertwined in Qatari society, as a result of their common roots in the inter-institutional system of the tribe. This analysis is followed by a discussion of how the interconnectedness of these institutional orders restricts the involvement of foreign private sector actors. Key contributions and suggestions for future research conclude the chapter.

MULTIPLE INSTITUTIONAL ORDERS OF SOCIETY AS MACROFOUNDATIONS: WHERE DOES THE "TRIBE" FIT?

The Inter-institutional System and its Associated Logics

Institutional theorists' efforts to understand the dynamics that shape organizations and their role in society have spanned multiple levels of analysis, yielding key insights about both top-down and bottom-up institutional processes (Greenwood, Oliver, Lawrence, & Meyer, 2017; Micelotta et al., 2017). This journey spanning the macro and the micro demonstrates the theoretical flexibility of the institutional perspective; and yet, the theoretical power of institutional explanations seemingly remains the strongest when we consider that institutions shape the context of organizational interactions and social actions at its foundations (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Selznick, 1948, 1949; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). It is, therefore, particularly appropriate to re-evaluate the role of institutions as providing the *macrofoundations* around which organizational life is framed and negotiated.

To this end, we suggest revisiting a key turning point in the intellectual journey of institutional theory: Friedland and Alford's (1991) introduction of the concept of *inter-institutional* system to describe how a set of overarching institutions at the societal-level shape individual and collective actions. Friedland and Alford's (1991) premise is that any attempt to understand individual or organizational behavior must first begin by unpacking how institutions "shape individual preferences and organizational interests as well as the repertoire of behaviors by which they attain them" (p. 232). These authors argue that the "central" institutional orders in Western societies are "capitalism, family, bureaucratic state, democracy and religion (Christianity)," and each of them is rooted in "a central logic – a set of material practices and symbolic constructions which constitute its organizing principles" (p. 248). Institutional logics are powerful constructs because they constitute the "content" and "distinctive categories, beliefs and motives" that signify the symbolic and material characteristics of each institution (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 253). For example, the logic of capitalism is "accumulation," that of democracy is "participation," and that of family is "community" (Thornton et al., 2012; Thornton & Occasion, 1999). These logics form the social reality that underlines and shapes interactions among individuals and organizations. As such, they "provide a link between institution and action," and form relevant frameworks for the examination of organizational fields (Reay & Hinings, 2009; Goodrick & Reay, 2011).

Friedland and Alford's (1991) contribution to the development of the logics perspective is widely recognized and appreciated (Thornton et al., 2012), but their emphasis on the institutional orders as core pillars of a society has become less and less central over time. As scholars have privileged the examination of the industry and the organizational field as units of analysis, the institutional logics perspective has become a powerful lens to understand dynamics between multiple field-level logics and their influence upon organizations (Varlander, Hinds, Thomason, Pearce, & Altman, 2016). Scholarly work on the relationships between potentially competing logics that derive from different societal orders (i.e., institutional pluralism) has blossomed (Kraatz & Block, 2008), and so has the investigation of how organizations respond to perceived competing demands (i.e., institutional complexity) through their strategies and structures (Greenwood et al., 2011).

Although of great value, the extensive body of work that builds on the notion of institutional orders has missed the opportunity to use this framework to understand how and why societies may fundamentally differ in their material and symbolic systems. First, scholarly attention continues to focus on the logics of the market, corporation, and profession (Fairclough & Micelotta, 2013). The institutional logics approach remains tightly linked to a narrow scholarly interest in organizations associated with the market (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017). This selectivity is arguably the result of the concentration of organizational studies on (primarily Western) contexts where these logics are the most salient and operate as the "underlying motors" of society (Fairclough & Micelotta, 2013, p. 67). Critically, non-market logics deriving from other institutional orders, such as the state, the community, and family have not received adequate attention (Greenwood et al., 2010). Therefore, we have limited understanding of how these institutional orders affect the configuration of society, and subsequently prescribe and proscribe organizational practices and behaviors. For example, Greenwood et al. (2010) point attention to the importance of examining the influence of the state logic on the community and market logics because the role of "the state logics becomes apparent and the meaning of their effects interpretable" only once logics are all placed within "an appropriate historical context" (p. 523). In their empirical examination of how the state logic in Spain affected the market logic and efforts of manufacturing firms to downsize their labor force, these authors demonstrate the importance of analyzing the mechanisms the state uses to secure social and political order. Greenwood et al. (2010) also showed how interest in what serves and strengthens familial ties preceded any material gains that would result from downsizing family firms and jeopardizing job security of their family members.

Similarly, the community and the family are critical institutional orders (Almandoz, Marquis, & Cheely, 2017; Fairclough & Micelotta, 2013; Thornton et al., 2012), and, yet, they remain the least examined in organizational theory. Communities are relevant because they "embody local understandings, norms, and rules" that legitimize the "mental modes upon which individuals and organizations draw" to formulate common perceptions of a situation (Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007, p. 927). As Lee and Lounsbury (2015) demonstrated, the saliency and prioritization of different kinds of community logics in geographic communities in Texas and Louisiana significantly affected environmental practices. Along the same lines, family institutional logics provide "a set of cultural rules and assumptions associated with notions of community and unconditional loyalty to family members and their reproductive needs" (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 248). Unconditional loyalty to the family forms the source of legitimacy for individuals whose key objective is to increase the family honor and prioritize it over other segments of society (Thornton et al., 2012). In a rare case of a study in non-Western contexts, Bhappu (2000) illustrated that family businesses, guided by the family institutional logic, resisted the Japanese government's pressures to "emulate Western organizational models," and established ties among other family business to "preserve their social capital' in society" (p. 414).

The limited attention to non-market institutional orders of society and the interrelationships with the "market" is particularly critical for institutional research conducted in non-Western contexts, where our theoretical assumptions regarding the tenets of institutional orders may not hold. Institutional scholars have repeatedly warned against the risks of limiting our knowledge to a Western context. Scott (2005) noted that "…a large proportion of our theoretical conceptions and empirical findings have been constructed by U.S. scholars based on data collected from U.S. organizations" (p. 478). Ten years later, however, the geographical concentration of knowledge is seemingly still an issue. As Johansen and Waldroff (2015) conclude, studies of institutional logics "are mainly located in Western-world contexts driven by market capitalism" where market dynamics dominate, leaving in the shadow the role of other institutional orders in shaping fields and organizations (p. 60).

In this chapter, we take the opportunity to explore a unique context (at least for a Western audience): the tribal societies of the Arab Gulf region. We unpack the relationships among the institutional orders of the market, the state, and the family in these societies where, as we will explain in detail, the "tribe is still the fundamental basis of society" (Salih, 2011, p. 143). Specifically, the tribe undergirds these institutional orders and provides a common inter-institutional system for the states in the Gulf region. Yet, where does the tribe fit in Friedland and Alford (1991) and Thornton et al. (2012)'s classification? We offer a brief overview of research in the sociology of tribes to set the foundations for our following discussion.

The Tribe as a Socio-political Form for Organizing Society

The concept of "tribe" or "tribalism" often conjures up negative associations such as "pre-Industrial Revolution or primitive form" of society (Makki, 2011, p. 446), "a symbol of social and political backwardness and reaction" (Maisel, 2014, p. 101), or "non-modernised societies and backwardness" (Segal, 2015, p. 128). Although a universally accepted definition does not exist, the New Oxford Dictionary (2005) defines tribe as "strongly associated with past attitudes of white colonialists towards the so-called primitive or uncivilized peoples living in remote undeveloped places." The Dictionary, therefore, advises "to use alternative terms such as community or people." Such descriptions of tribes as pre-modern forms of society have resulted in intense debates that cut across several disciplines such as cultural anthropology, history, and biology (Maisel, 2014).

Studies in the sociology of tribes suggest that tribes are socio-cultural ethnic entities that serve as social organizations that unite a community of individuals based on linguistic and cultural heritage. For instance, in Africa, tribes represent groups of people labeled as "ethnies" who share similar ethnic and cultural backgrounds and are united by marriage ties and similar rituals (Tapper, 1990). Furthermore, Crone (1986) enlists tribes such as those in Yoruba of Africa, the Kalinga of the Philippines, and the Murngin of Australia as culturally bound communities who speak the same dialect, worship the same deity, and share the same customs. Therefore, they are best described as "culture-bearing units" where individuals are accustomed to certain traditions since birth, but these units do not constitute a "political organization" (p. 448), nor do they "function as political units" (Crone, 1993, p. 362). Crone (1986) suggests that tribes can become political entities only if tribesmen consciously attribute political significance to their tribes and organize themselves as such.

Interestingly, in the context of the Middle East, tribes have a distinctive *political* nature. They have played a fundamental role as cultural socio-political structures for organizing society within the Arab states of the Gulf for centuries (Makki, 2011). The distinctive feature of tribes in the Middle East is that they are "political communities" which inherit their identities and political orientations from local tribal customs (Crone, 1993, p. 362), and from traditional laws passed from their predecessors (Al-Naqib, 1996). From this vantage point, a tribe constitutes an "adaptive social form specifically configured to socially and politically organize people" (Al-shawi & Gardner, 2013, p. 50). The political nature of tribes in the Arabian Gulf and their emphasis on political legitimacy (Makki, 2011) renders them distinctive from tribes in other parts of the globe (Khoury & Kistiner, 1990). As a political structure, a tribe encompasses complex hierarchical relations among individuals based on rank and status. Importantly, kin and family relations form the foundations of legitimacy and membership (Al-Naqib, 1996). Therefore, tribes continue to function as powerful institutions in this region with "highly centralized political features" that exercise influence on the state to the extent that a tribe and a state "form a dialectical symbiosis: they mingle and sustain each other … each part changes owing to the other's influence" (Khoury & Kistiner, 1990, p. 6).

Understanding the unique role that tribes play in Arab societies is critical for two reasons. First, the tribe still represents a pillar of these societies, despite strong predictions for their demise (Salih, 2011). The sociologist Ibn Khaldun (1981) suggested that tribal communities would cease to exist once their inhabitants migrated to urban life-style and overcame the environmental and economic challenges that forced them to remain together to secure subsistence and access to water (Al-shawi & Gardner, 2013; Ronfeldt, 1991). Indeed, tribalism is of marginal significance in other parts of the world. It is "only in the Middle East that tribal people remain as a permanent presence" (Khoury & Kostiner, 1991, p. iff), and "tribal affinities are still alive and well in the twenty-first century" (Maisel, 2014, p. 101).

Second, the nations of the Gulf have established modern states with a centralized capitalist system, despite widespread assumptions that tribal values hinder economic expansion and growth (Colson, 1974). North (1991, p. 104) states that innovations that change trading practices in the *souq* (market) would "threaten survival in a tribal society" because preservation of tradition and custom exceeds interest in other materialistic gains. Besides, these states lack the skills and knowledge to bypass the nomadic and pearl-based economies they have practiced for centuries (Al-Naqib, 1996). Some scholars even went further to state that "a society cannot advance far … with a tribal organization" because the "tribal form is particularly limited and inefficient for dealing with problems of rule and administration" (Ronfeldt, 1991, p. 5). Based on these observations, it is interesting to analyze the persistence of tribalism and the success of Arabian Gulf states in establishing modern economies.

From a theoretical standpoint, the notion of tribe poses an intriguing puzzle about the relationship with the institutional orders described by Friedland and Alford (1991), Thornton (2004), and Thornton et al. (2012). To the original list of pillars of society (capitalism, family, state, democracy, and religion), Thornton and colleagues added the profession, corporation, and community. This list, clearly representative of Western societies, does not describe well the Arab world and the centrality of the *tribe* as a fundamental overarching principle that ties together the orders of family, market, and state governance. In our analysis, we will focus attention to how this pillar shapes the relationship between these institutional orders. We will show that in Qatar family, market, and state orders are still reflective of the dominance of the tribe; clearly separated in Western contexts, these institutions share tenuous boundaries in Qatari society. Notably, the inter-institutional system that has its focus in the tribe deeply influences whether and how Western-based organizational forms (such as PPPs) are perceived and received.

THE EMPIRICAL CONTEXT OF PPPs

In the last decades, PPPs have emerged as an innovative policy instrument that can enable the achievement of greater public and social value (Flinders, 2005; OECD, 2013; World Bank, 2014). PPPs are considered particularly beneficial for the development of large infrastructural projects, where they are defined as contractual "arrangements that involve private companies in the financing and provision of infrastructure … aimed at overcoming public sector financing, incentive, and capacity constraints" (Jooste & Scott, 2012, p. 150). PPPs can bring together the distinctive qualities of the public and private sectors and deliver infrastructure projects with higher levels of efficiency and value for money (Marsilio, Cappellaro, & Cuccurullo, 2011; Osborne, 2000). They also promise to transfer project risks to the party that is best suited to handle them, as well as provide access to the know-how and effective delivery of services that result from highly competitive bidding processes (Savas, 2000). Governments are attracted to PPPs because they provide immediate access to private finance, and, hence, relieve them from the burden of funding projects through the public purse. Similarly, the market sector considers PPP arrangements as an opportunity to foster growth and profits by building synergies and long-term partnerships with the government. These arrangements guarantee access to long-term contractual arrangements for the development and operation of large infrastructure projects for up to 25 years (Weihe, 2010).

At its inception, research about PPPs primarily revolved around the technical and strategic requirements for the successful implementation and effective performance of these projects (Alam, Kabir, & Chaudhari, 2014; Wang & Zhao, 2018; Warsen, Nederhand, Klijn, & Grotenberg, 2018). However, in this line of research, scholars have begun to note that similar PPP projects often yield divergent outcomes in different countries, even though they seemingly provide the same technical requirements and the appropriate level of expertise (Engwall, 2003; Manning, 2008). This observation has turned the attention to the potentially critical role that the *institutional context* surrounding large infrastructure projects may play in shaping the processes and outcomes of PPPs. Scholars have come to recognize the "necessity to understand projects in their organization and historical contexts" and determine which types of project organizing "fit into the established *norms* and *values* of [their] environment" (Engwall, 2003, pp. 801–804; see also Jooste, Levitt, & Scott 2011; Mahalingam & Delhi, 2012; Petersen, 2010). The scholarly community studying PPPs is thus calling for a better understanding of "the practices involved in organizing [projects], and the institutional contexts in which these practices are embedded" (Biesenthal, Clegg, Mahalingam, & Sankaran, 2018, p. 44; Söderlund, Sankaran, & Biesenthal, 2017).

Most of the research that addresses how the institutional context enables and constrains PPP projects has compared different countries and explored whether there is compatibility between the local context and the requirements of PPP projects. By pointing at how differences between the institutional profiles of different countries may influence the acceptance and implementation of PPPs, this line of research has yielded interesting theoretical insights. For example, Jooste and Scott (2012) found that Canada and Australia have a bigger uptake of PPPs than South Africa. Such difference is due to the degree to which public, private, and non-for-profit entities cooperate and demonstrate readiness and flexibility in designing PPP projects. Similarly, Matos-Castaño, Mahalingam, and Geert Dewulf (2014) show that the Netherland's use of PPPs in several key infrastructure sectors was driven by the perception of PPPs as a legitimate and proper instrument of delivering infrastructure services. Conversely, in India, there is no such culture of legitimacy of private involvement in delivering services, which resulted in a sluggish adoption of PPPs. Another study comparing 20 European countries examined governmental support for PPPs and asked whether this is conducive or preventive for the introduction and diffusion of PPPs (Verhoest, Petersen, Scherrer, & Soecipto, 2015). The study found that governmental support for PPPs and PPP take-up are positively correlated, but rather modestly in strength.

However, it is noticeable that this stream of work has developed primarily within the boundaries of Western countries, where the capitalist system has established the institutional order of the market as a dominant force in society (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Indeed, the concept of PPP itself reflects the understanding that the institutional orders of the state and market co-exist despite their potentially "conflicting institutional logics" (Biesenthal et al., 2018, p. 44). As Common (2000, p. 137) suggests, "partnerships are indigenous to the West and Western cultural values," and PPPs reveal the "growing consensus about the legitimacy of encouraging the private sector and the non-profit sectors to provide public services" (Common, 2000, p. 134). Our examination reveals important insights on the implications of maintaining a tribal form of social organizing while opening up economies to "foreign" organizational forms, such as PPPs, and associated practices.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

The empirical material of this chapter is based on a broader project led by the first author on the implementation of PPPs in several Gulf countries. This chapter reports the findings of the qualitative case study of the country of Qatar. Given the paucity of extant research, the choice of an exploratory case study design was considered particularly suitable, to address "how" questions (Yin, 2014) and to extend theory in an unfamiliar context of which existing knowledge is scant or underdeveloped (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).

Research Context

Qatar – a small state located in the Arabian Gulf region – is endowed with 14% of total world natural gas reserves, making it the third largest after Russia and Iran (GECF, 2017). Similar to other states in the region (e.g., Kuwait and Saudi Arabia), Qatar's economy is largely dependent on revenues from oil and gas exports (Table 1). Given their massive dependence on external rents derived from selling natural resources, these countries are defined as "rentier economies" (Mahdavy, 1970), and typically lack the sophisticated industrial sectors developed in non-rentier economies (Belbawi, 1987; Kamrava, 2017).

Table 2 illustrates the institutional orders in Qatari society. Differently from the institutional orders in Western societies, the pillars cannot be clearly demarcated in our setting. The tribe provides an overarching inter-institutional system that integrates three institutional orders: The Ruling Family, the Bureaucratic State, and the Market/Private Sector. The emphasis on loyalty to the tribe, associated with the inherent fragility of the Sheikhs' rulership and the reliance on powerful interest groups (i.e., tribal leaders and merchant families) creates a unique socio-political system that bears little resemblance to Western systems of governance, market, and civil society (Kamrava, 2011).

To start with, tribal legacy defines who the Ruler of Qatar is (the Emir). Political appointments as leaders of their tribes (*Sheikh*) are decided based on familial origins and tribal solidarity (*asabiyya)*. According to Onley and Khalaf (2006), a Sheikh could not succeed to the rulership of his tribe without support from his family members, and his family had to "continue to approve of his rulership, lest they replace him with other members of the family" (p. 193). The Sheikh could only maintain his legitimacy by convincing the notables of his own tribe to collaborate with him to manage the daily affairs of the tribe (Shaul, 2014). Historically, in pre-oil Gulf states, loyalty to the tribe was stronger than loyalty to religion. Belonging to a tribe was unambiguous and critical for people's survival within the harsh and dry ecological conditions of the Gulf region (Fandy, 1994). Scarcity of water and food, along with the threat of invasions from neighboring tribes,

Table 1. General Macro-economic Indications of Qatar in 2017.

Surface Area (sq. km)	Qatari Citizens (thousands)	Expatriate Residents in Qatar (millions)	GDP (US$ billions)	General Government Revenue: % of Oil and Gas	GDP per Capita (US$)	GDP Growth (%)	Tax Revenue (% of GDP)
11,610	313,000	2.2	340	48.70	124,529	2.10	0

Source: IMF and World Bank databases (2017).

Table 2. Institutional Orders in Qatar Society.

	Tribe as Inter-institutional System *that* Integrates		
	Ruling Family	Bureaucratic State	Market/Private Sector
Source of legitimacy	Ascendance from the Al-Thani tribe	Distributing largess and the financial resources from natural gas to Qatari citizens	Merchant families control specific sectors in the market, ascendance from prominent merchant families
Source of authority	Patriarchal domination of the Qatari Emir with support of his family members	Members of the Qatari ruling family are distributed across significant bureaucratic organizations and make decisions that best serve their interests	Members of the ruling family along with Qatari affluent merchant families are entitled to lucrative government contracts, connections with the ruling family
Basis of norms	Membership Al-Thani tribe or marriages with influential tribes such as Al-Thani, Al-Attiyah, Al-Kuwari, Al-Naim	Recruitment in state bureaucracy and salaries for Qataris are based on familiar origins, tribal affiliations rather than experience or any meritocratic considerations	Competition and award of government contracts is largely dependent on closeness to the ruling family rather than competence or value for money
Basis of loyalty	Inter-family and inter-tribe marriages to solidify relations between the ruling family and other dominant tribes in Qatar	Entitlement to lucrative government jobs is subject to absolute obedience and political acquiescence to the Emir of Qatar	Entitlement to lucrative government contracts is subject to absolute obedience and political acquiescence to the Emir of Qatar

necessitated strong group solidarity, and "loyalty to family and tribe remained the individual's primary commitment" to ensure safety and survival (Shaul, 2014, p. 14). This commitment guided individual's behavior by, for example, restricting marriage and limiting trade partners within the boundaries of the family and tribe, and alienating non-tribal members (Shaul, 2014). In special occasions, the practice of inter-marriages among conflicting tribes was used to sanction alliances, declare peace, and demonstrate goodwill (Maisel, 2014).

The "tribal and family connections remain important forces in Qatari society" (Kamrava, 2017, p. 5), and have deeply shaped the development of the state bureaucracy. In particular, Fromherz (2012, p. 129) argues that the Emir's personalization of state institutions meant that there is "no meaningful distinction, either political or legal, between the person of the Emir and the institutions of the state," which renders the "government a family enterprise" (Bahry, 2013, p. 253). In other words, the State is considered a personal property of the Emir of Qatar. This is particularly relevant if we consider that in Qatar, as in other Arab Gulf states, the role of the State is primarily to be a distributer of wealth from oil revenues. Since the rulers in Gulf states "see themselves as the owners rather than the rulers of their countries," the discovery of oil and gas meant that the Sheikhs suddenly owned a wealth of unprecedented magnitude, but they still had to effectively distribute it to the members of the wider tribal communities in a manner that ensured their allegiance (Rathmell & Schulze, 2000, p. 56). More than ever, the legitimacy of political leaders depended on their family and tribal leaders and they needed stronger protective mechanisms to maintain their rulership (Kamrava, 2009). Distribution of oil wealth, therefore, enabled the continuation of pre-oil era's traditional practice of awarding gifts and privileges in return for loyalty and political acquiescence (Khodr, 2014).

The state bureaucracy in Qatar is an important vehicle for formally distributing largess to loyalists of the Al-Thani tribe. Policy-making is exclusively limited to members of the ruling family who advocate for policies or initiatives that best serve their interests (Khodr, 2014). The role of the State as distributor of oil revenues intensified the importance of familial ties within the tribal society. The Sheikhs guarantee the support of their family members by assigning them to prominent government positions that entitled them to lavish salaries and gratuities (Common, 2008). Salih (2011) notes that these jobs do not usually require higher academic or technical qualifications because the main criteria for acquiring them is largely the tribal affiliation and closeness to the rulers (Khodr, 2014). Herb (1999) even stated that key ministries, such as the Ministry of Defence or Interior, are typically assigned to the closest and most trusted members of the royal family to ensure the stability of the political regime. Chaudhry (1987) also notes that other ministries, such as Public Works and Infrastructure, Agriculture, or Commerce, are assigned to individuals from specific tribal families with a history of exercising a monopoly over these sectors. Furthermore, the wider segments of the population are entitled to guarantee government jobs with generous salaries and benefits as their legitimate share of oil revenues (Biygautane, Neesham, & Al-Yahya, 2019).

Along the same lines, the private sector is also allocated to members of prominent merchant families in the Gulf (Ali, 1995). Insurance companies, cars' dealerships, and infrastructure development or banking sectors are controlled by merchant families with traditionally close links to the members of the ruling families (Kamrava, 2017). The survival of these companies relies heavily on government contracts that "are seen as royal favours." In other words, "contracts are given as expression of royal gratitude" to merchant families who express their allegiance and support to the rulers (Belbawi, 1987, p. 55), and not necessarily to those with more experience or competence. The private sector in Qatar is dominated by members of the ruling family and trusted members of prominent tribes who control both access to the market and its resources. In contrast to liberal economies where private sector firms operate and compete freely and are governed by the market dynamics of demand and supply, in Qatar, the private sector relies heavily on government contracts to survive and only re-cycles oil-rents, and contributes marginally to economic growth (Kamrava, 2017). Furthermore, access to the local market and government resources depends to an extreme degree on tribal origins and closeness to the ruling family (Kamrava, 2018). The private sector is dominated by powerful merchant families who control key sectors in the economy and restrict or inhibit the access of any foreign companies that threaten to compete with the local ones (Mansoor, 2007). The marriage ties of the powerful players in the market with the

Al-Thani (the ruling family) not only guarantees lucrative contracts, but favoritism, too, in designing economic policies that serve their interests and protect them from external competitors (Mansoor, 2007).

The tribe as a form of social organization persists in the Gulf region and informally shapes how formal institutions are structured as well as how they function. It is, therefore, critical to understand the peculiarities of the local institutional context. The institutional orders of the family, state, and market/private sector within the Arab states of the Gulf are instantiated differently than in Western contexts. Accordingly, it is important to examine the impact of the institutional orders composing the tribal *inter-institutional* system on the adoption of "foreign" practices and organizational forms.

Given these features, Qatar provides a relevant context to examine the adoption of PPPs. The unique way in which the state and the market are intertwined profoundly influences how policies and tools conceived in Western countries are adopted in tribal and traditional societies. Despite the acute inefficiencies associated with the traditional public procurement method (Biygautane, 2017), only a handful of PPP projects have been completed in this country, and exclusively in the power and water desalination sectors (Table 3). Although the Qatari government promised to deliver several social projects (hospitals and schools) and others related to the FIFA 2022 World Cup in 2015 (MEED, 2015) using PPPs, none of these projects have come to fruition so far.

Table 3. PPPs Projects Completed in Qatar (up to 2016).

Project Name	Sector	Contract Value in US$	Contract Duration	Type of PPP	Project Status and Capacity
1. Ras Laffan A IWPP	Power/water desalination	700 million	25	BOT	Project Commercial operation in 2004 (850 MW, 181,843 M^3/day)
2. Ras Laffan B IWPP	Power/water desalination	900 million	25	BOOT	Project Commercial operation in 2008 (1,025 MW, 27,500 M^3/day)
3. Mesaieed IPP	Power	2.3 billion	25	BOOT	Project Commercial operation in 2010 (2,000 MW)
4. Ras Laffan C IWPP	Power/water desalination	3.9 billion	25	BOOT	Project Commercial operation in 2011 (2,730 MW, 286,400 M^3/day)
5. Umm Al Houl IWPP (Facility D)	Power/water desalination	3.15 billion	25	BOOT	Financial closure in November 2015. First phase was operational in July 2018 (2,520 MW, 590,000 M^3/day)

Source: Adapted from Biygautane (2017).

Table 4. Number of Interviewees and Sectors Represented.

Interviewees by Sector	Number
Government	6
Private	5
Legal	3
Consultancy	4
Engineering	1
Policy analysis	4
Total	23

Data Collection and Analysis

We collected data from primary and secondary sources. Primary data were collected through 23 semi-structured face-to-face interviews conducted by the first author between May 2015 and November 2017. Interviewees were selected based on their direct involvement and/or knowledge of PPPs implementation in Qatar. They were representatives of key sectors and organizations involved in the design and implementation of PPPs. The first author relied on personal connections to identify actors who could provide reliable and useful insights based on their experience and familiarity with Qatar. Other informants were selected through a snowball approach, based on suggestions provided during the interviews (Table 4). The interviews lasted between 40 minutes and 3 hours, were conducted in the native languages of the informants (Arabic and English), and were transcribed verbatim. Translations of interviews conducted in Arabic were made available to the other authors. Information regarding the organizations or individuals involved in the interviews is kept to a minimum to protect their identity, as they only agreed to speak on the condition of full anonymity.

The second source of data was archival sources. Forty-three documents were collected and thoroughly examined. Those included government and consultancy reports, newspaper articles in Arabic and English, research articles, and resources that were provided by interviewees, such as background research on the engagement of the Qatari government and private sector entities in the implementation of PPPs. These sources were extremely important to triangulate interview data and understand government attitudes and policies toward PPPs.

The data analysis followed the procedures for building theory from qualitative evidence from a triangulation of sources (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013; Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 1994). We used an inductive approach to preserve interviewees' accounts of how societal-level institutional dynamics have affected the adoption and implementation of PPPs. Simultaneously, we consistently compared and contrasted our emerging codes with the characteristics of the institutional orders in the literature. Our first step was to upload the interview transcripts into NVivo software and initiate an open coding process to familiarize ourselves with the key factors that interviewees identified as challenging or problematic for the implementation of PPPs in Qatar. These issues were then categorized in 87 initial codes.

The second step focused on axial coding to further aggregate initial codes (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Data were perused several times to check for overlapping codes, and their number was reduced to 11 second-order themes. These are represented in Table 5 in the column *Effects on PPPs* and numbered as a1, a2, etc. Second-order themes provide an informant view of the factors that have shaped the discourse about PPPs in Qatar and affected its adoption and implementation. To understand how these emerging explanations could be aggregated and connected to the underpinning characteristics of the institutional orders of society in Qatar, we went back and forth between the data and the features of institutional orders. We connected our emerging explanation to these features to reveal the underlying mechanisms through which the ruling family, bureaucratic state, and market/private sector created a particularly hostile environment for the implementation of PPPs. Table 5 shows our analytical process and supporting illustrative quotes.

PROLOGUE: THE INTERMITTENT EXCITEMENT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PPPs

In Qatar, the idea of using a PPP model for delivering infrastructure services has been primarily promoted by international organizations and consultancy firms. Several international organizations packaged the PPP model as a way for the country to increase the contribution of the private sector to its GDP, which stood at a meager 10% compared to 60% in other nations (World Bank Data, 2018). The United Nations (UN) offered its expertise to support the government to develop its capacity and to adopt PPP consistently for infrastructure delivery.

Starting in 2011, several government entities began to embrace enthusiastically the idea of PPP projects for infrastructure development. The Ministry of Business and Trade (now renamed the Ministry of Economy and Business) established a PPP directorate to conduct feasibility studies and explore the prospects of PPP for the country. The Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry also advocated for PPPs, emphasizing the "massive foreign direct investment opportunities that might spring from financing local projects through international banks" (Qatari businessman, Interview). Another government entity – the Qatar Financial Centre – expressed interest in PPPs, arguing that it was important to invest government funds in international financial markets and use private finance for developing infrastructure projects.

Government departments hired international consultants to establish the necessary legal and regulatory frameworks that would guarantee the uptake of PPPs. The Ministry of Economy and Business began drafting a PPP law, which was completed by 2013. The Qatar Financial Centre sought the support of international consultancy firms to "put in place the regulatory framework for PPPs" (Management consultant, Interview), and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry organized several workshops to explain to government and private sector participants the potential for efficiency and increased value for money that PPPs offered. The General Secretariat for Development Planning issued the Qatar National Development Strategy (2011) in which it stated that PPPs "may benefit some projects [World FIFA 2022] and should be considered within wider public investment decision processes" (p. 61).

Table 5. How the Macrofoundations of Qatari Society Affect the Implementation of PPPs.

	Effects on PPPs	Illustrative Quotes
(A) Ruling family:		
A1. Patriarchal domination of the ruling family over the state and market resources	a1. Fusion of public and private sectors renders PPPs conceptually irrelevant	"Ruling family gets into business by sitting in boards of large private businesses, and dominating membership in Chamber of Commerce and Industry to make sure that they really control the private market, and ensure that they also have a share in it." (Academic policy analyst, Interview)
A2. Maintaining power within the Al-Thani family requires preserving interests and loyalty of members of all tribal communities	a2. Prioritizing the needs of certain interest groups reduces the relevance of PPP	"Government here makes sure that it does not upset the local merchant families to sustain their loyalty … before it puts any laws, it consults with key local business leaders that their interests are not affected." (Private sector informant, Interview)
	a2i. Unpredictability of government decisions increases uncertainty of foreign investors and the feasibility of PPPs	"PPPs are long-term relationships and unpredictability of decision-makers here is not useful when you deal with contractors and concessionaires because they involve investors' borrowed money and it is usually billions of dollars." (Semi-government representative, Interview)
(B) Bureaucratic state:		
B1. State dominance and lack of independent private sector	b1. State dominance makes efficiency arguments in favor of PPPs less effective	"[…]the idea of putting minimum resources and getting maximum benefits is not yet able to sell itself to decision makers in Qatar." (Private sector informant, Interview)
	b1i. State dominance disfavors delivery of mega-infrastructure services by private sector	"[…]the government likes to do everything on its own. The role of the government is very big in infrastructure, in services, in everything." (Government official, Interview) "the current priority of government is to establish key infrastructure that is important for development; the basics of any country that experiences fast development." (Private sector informant, Interview)
B2. State role as a largess distributing mechanism and recruitment based on tribal affiliations	b2. Human capital lacks the technical, managerial and legal requirements of PPPs	"Most government employees do not understand the basics of standard contracts, let alone PPP agreements. If you do not have the basics of a normal contracting agreement, how can you do a very complex PPP project?" (Legal consultant, Interview)
	b2i. Bureaucracy and inefficiencies hinder the creation of PPP-friendly ecosystem	"The bureaucracy is very slow here and it will take you almost a year just to get the planning approved for just a family house." (Private sector informant, Interview)

(C) Market/private sector:		
C1. Norms of family, tribal loyalty and allegiance to ruling family govern award of contracts	c1. Lack of market norms of competition and efficiency hinders PPP arrangements	"Most projects are not delivered on time and within budget because there is really no pressure from the government on these local contractors to deliver within parameters of budget and time." (Management consultant, Interview)
		"Qatari business families monopolize trade and commerce in the country and are shielded by powerful members of the ruling family who award them contracts based on tribal origins and loyalty to the family." (Academic policy analyst, Interview)
C2. Lack of independent private sector	c2. Private sector's heavy dependence on government funding renders PPPs unfeasible	"The key ingredient for PPP is private finance, but that does not exist here. The private sector here is weak and its main source of income is government contracts. You remove government support, and the private sector gets bankrupt." (Private sector representative, Interview)
	c2i. Local private sector lacks the technical capacity to deliver PPPs	"[…]the private sector here is not well developed and does not have sufficient capacity nor quality in service delivery, and it relies extremely on foreign contractors to do any job." (Former government employee, Interview)

Enthusiasm about PPPs, nonetheless, was short-lived. Between 2011 and 2014, several changes occurred. The PPP directorate was dissolved, the PPP law never made it beyond the draft stage and the proposed regulatory frameworks were shelved. Interviewees stated that political actors at the upper echelon were not receptive to the PPP idea; government entities in charge of infrastructure services were not attracted to the PPP model and neither was the local private sector community. However, when oil prices declined by more than 50% in the second half of 2014 and Qatar experienced its first budget deficit in 15 years (The National, 2015), PPPs reappeared in Qatar's policy agenda.

The Minister of Economy and Trade personally delivered keynote speeches at several workshops and conferences and championed the ministry's efforts to create a friendly environment for PPPs (Foreman, 2016). In 2015, the Ministry established a PPP unit with a larger staff. By March, it drafted a new PPP law to be submitted for approval to the Council of Ministers by August and promised that the law would be effective by 2016. Several PPP projects in health and education were announced and international investors were invited to bid for them. However, neither the PPP projects in health and education nor the PPP law has materialized yet. Similar to earlier attempts to pass a PPP law, the Ministry kept postponing the date of its release until it stopped making announcements. At the time of writing (end of 2018), the PPP law has not been passed.

If the promises of efficiency and value for money that underline PPPs and the budgetary constraints Qatar faced during the dwindling oil prices in mid-2014 did not generate a commitment to PPPs, what factors can explain such reluctance?

HOW THE MACROFOUNDATIONS OF QATARI SOCIETY INFLUENCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PPPs

In this section, we discuss how each of the institutional orders of Qatari society – embedded in the inter-institutional system of the tribe – has influenced the implementation of PPPs in Qatar.

Ruling Family

First, it was evident from our findings that the patriarchal domination of the Ruling family and their desire to preserve and maintain power deeply influenced the extent to which PPPs are considered relevant and a priority in three ways.

The fusion of public and private sectors in Qatar renders PPPs conceptually irrelevant: The interest of ruling family members in pursuing lucrative opportunities from "recycling" government funds through the private sector renders the suitability of the PPP model highly questionable. The ruling family in Qatar presides over key governmental and semi-governmental entities, but it also owns large business corporations, in alliance with prominent business families. The established partnership between the ruling and merchant families in Qatar serves their personal interests.

In Western contexts, the boundaries of the public and private sectors are clearly defined, with laws prohibiting government officials from holding public jobs while managing private assets. In Qatar, however, members of the ruling family formalize their participation in the private sector by holding multiple board positions. Occasionally, they recruit prominent merchant family members to run their businesses. Although a law exists that prohibits government employees to run businesses, "this law is universally ignored even by the lowest ranking public servants" (Policy Analysis, Interview). Such practices explain why government officials resist PPPs. PPPs would prevent such opportunistic behaviors because they have the sophisticated project governance mechanisms required by investors and banks to initiate any infrastructure project.

Prioritizing the needs of certain interest groups reduces the relevance of PPPs: To protect their power and personal interests in the private sector, members of the ruling family consult closely with merchant families before they enact any laws or regulation that might affect the interests of these families. Several individuals interviewed in this research stressed that this factor shadows the need for, or the relevance of, PPPs. A young Qatari businessman stated that: "[…]personally, I think it is a harmful attitude when the government does not take into consideration the overall benefits of PPPs to the wider community and the country." Older generations of merchant families are accustomed to quick gains from the local construction market and are not familiar with the high levels of complexity associated with PPPs and the long time needed to profit from PPP investments; thus, they do not support their adoption for infrastructure delivery. Members of the ruling family prioritize the needs of the merchants to maintain their loyalty to their tribal origins and strengthen ties.

The unpredictability of government decisions increases uncertainty for foreign investors and the feasibility of PPPs: The interconnectedness between the members of the ruling family and private actors also results in a highly unpredictable and volatile policy-making environment. Since most government institutions are not capable of independently developing public policy, several actors representing the government or private sectors recourse to informal channels to approach powerful actors within the ruling family to support their needs. Furthermore, this situation is exacerbated by the fact that government positions tend to reflect the personal interests of individuals rather than clear organizational goals and interests. Changes of policy make international investors hesitant to invest in the long-term contracts required by PPPs (up to 25 or 30 years). Qatar is perceived as a risky environment to embark in these investment arrangements.

Bureaucratic State

The role of the Bureaucratic state also emerged prominently as a critical roadblock for PPPs. We found that the dominance of the state in economic matters and the lack of independent development of the private sector make PPPs a less desirable option, in particular for basic infrastructure that are urgently needed. Furthermore, the inefficiency of state government makes PPPs too difficult to implement.

State dominance makes efficiency arguments in favor of PPPs less effective: In the West, PPPs are portrayed as useful tools to address budget deficits and reverting to private finance to provide social and economic infrastructure projects.

Qatar's large cash reserves, however, fuel the private sector's growth and do not make PPPs a relevant policy option. Despite the recent considerable drop in oil prices, Qatar is a small country with no budget deficit and the availability of massive sovereign wealth. Thus, infrastructure development remains affordable and the government is able to fund infrastructures without the involvement of foreign investors. As a Qatari businessman stated:

> we are not poor when it comes to resources, we are one of the richest countries in the world, so it is not natural, or even logical that we bring someone from outside the country as a partner, regardless of how much risk they assume.

PPPs' promise of a higher level of efficiency in service delivery is, therefore, a secondary issue. Several interviewees pointed to the construction of Hamad International Airport as an extreme representation of the lack of efficiency in the construction industry. International best practices suggest that airports with a cost of more than 1 billion dollars should be managed as PPPs because they represent a lucrative business due to the guaranteed flow of passengers (OECD, 2013). The airport in Qatar met all these criteria, and, yet, it was still built on a regular contract (EPC). In fact, it had a staggering cost overrun of more than 300%, with a final cost of \$17 billion (Lo, 2012), and was delivered 7 years after the original deadline.

State dominance disfavors delivery of large PPPs infrastructure services by private sector: Another challenge for implementing PPPs in Qatar is due to the government's extensive role in providing basic infrastructure services and maintaining responsibility for its citizens' needs from "the cradle to the grave." In contrast to other countries where the role of the government is relatively smaller, and the private sector plays a considerable role in financing, constructing and operating projects, in Qatar, the government remains the sole powerful actor in the construction industry. Such dominance defies the purpose of PPPs, which is to hand projects to the private sector and, thus, decrease government's involvement. However, this process requires a certain level of government maturity, which Qatar has not yet achieved.

Qatar is a relatively recent country that focused during the mid-1980s on developing the necessary infrastructure for extracting natural gas and oil in massive commercial quantities. It only began the race to build a modern country with sophisticated infrastructure in the mid-1990s. Transforming a desert into a state that competes with global economic powers requires the rapid development of social and economic infrastructure projects, for example, schools with educational facilities and hospitals with reliable and modern equipment. As a state, Qatar is still in its early phase of state development process and has not developed sufficient institutional or managerial capacity to know how to use PPPs to correct past mistakes. As a management consultant told us:

> Qatar is still in the state building experimentation phases, and the problem with countries in such a phase is the cost of experimentation is very high because they are still learning how to do things right.

The urgency of these projects does not make them viable for PPPs, which are typically very lengthy and complex. Therefore, the EPC contracting remains the only reliable model to match the country's rapid economic development.

According to a government official, the country's "priorities are different from other countries concerned about efficiency. We have massive milestones to achieve in a very quick manner." Furthermore, the government of Qatar does not charge its citizens for public services, so highways cannot generate revenue from fees, and neither can other services such as health and education. A representative of a semi-government entity suggested that:

> the state has reached most of its developmental objectives, more than other Arab countries, but it reached this level through the government procurement model, which is not the most efficient, but it delivered regardless.

Human capital lacks the technical, managerial, and legal requirements for PPPs: The unique characteristics and functions of the public sector as a largess-distributing mechanism through government salaries problematizes the implementation of PPPs in several ways. Public sector employees lack the motivation to improve since their salaries are guaranteed as part of a social pact with the rulers and tribal leaders. Hence, no attention is usually paid to the credentials of Qataris when they apply for government jobs, "there are very few Qatari public sector employees who understand the basics of the EPC contractual set-ups which only involve simple contractor-owner relationship" (Public Sector Official, Interview). Introducing the PPP model is even more challenging. As a management consultant stated:

> PPP is extremely complex, and very problematic even in the UK, and it requires a very mature and well-established legal and judicial systems and capable public sector employees who have the capacity to run them.

Therefore, the absence of PPP relevant legal and regulatory frameworks is attributed to the lack of interest in any contractual arrangement other than the EPC, and the insufficient human capacity to run such sophisticated legal arrangements.

Bureaucracy and inefficiencies hinder the creation of a PPP-friendly ecosystem: Given the insufficient qualification of many government employees, the state bureaucracy has become a largely slow and inefficient machinery that does not support the requirements of PPPs. Several private sector actors pointed to the lengthy procedures required to get a license or authorization to begin construction. As one stated: "the problem of bureaucracy is terrible, it will not let you do anything except after a year or so. If you want to build tomorrow, you cannot. This will not work for PPPs because things have to get done so quickly." Furthermore, the government lacks the fiscal management framework required to administer and repay the private sector over the span of 20–30 years. Such framework also necessitates sophisticated collaboration among government entities. In Qatar, government entities do not collaborate effectively, nor have modern systems of sharing complex sets of data as required for PPP contracting. Therefore, the persistence of structural challenges complicates the implementation of PPP policy. The bureaucratic ecosystem requires upgrading to a managerial level that matches the requirements and sophistication of PPPs. "There is a need for a wide range of more fundamental changes to happen on the ground before you introduce PPPs" (Management Consultant, Interview).

Market/Private Sector

Finally, we found that the characteristics of the private sector in Qatar, because of the dominance of tribal forms of organizing, importantly challenged the feasibility of implementation of PPPs. It inhibits the development of necessary competition and skills to implement PPPs and, thus, reinforces the dependence of the private sector on the state.

Lack of market norms of competition and efficiency hinders PPP arrangements: Similar to other Gulf countries, the private sector in Qatar is composed of a small number of powerful merchant families who have traditionally established strong relations with the ruling Al-Thani family. Connections to government officials are particularly important in securing land, which is strictly controlled by the government. As a legal consultant stated:

> links with key decision makers in the government is the main factor that determines who gets a contract and who does not, and these families will use their influence to get their part in government projects and contracts.

The dependence of merchants on members of the ruling family creates market dynamics that do not offer a favorable environment for PPP projects. PPPs require a private sector space where competition and quality of delivery matter the most, and where the forces of the invisible hands of the economy determine the curves of supply and demand in the local economy. In Qatar, merchant families are not expected to deliver services with a negotiated level of efficiency; in contrast, by prolonging projects and continuously tapping to government revenues, the merchants ensure to receive their share of oil and gas revenues and show their allegiance to the rulers.

Private sector's heavy dependence on government funding renders PPPs unfeasible: Given the role of government in Qatari society, the beating heart of the local economy is composed of large conglomerate corporations owned and funded by the government. Other smaller firms owned by merchant families are fully dependent on government cash distributions through contracts or long-term concessions. A senior policy analyst stated that: "companies go after government to be their stakeholder because it becomes a guarantee that they do not go bankrupt, and in times of crisis, the government comes to rescue them." Therefore, small companies compete for government involvement in their boards and in buying their shares because it is a protective mechanism in times of financial crises.

The Qatar context is in striking contrast to the Western context where the public sector initiated the PPP model to address the government's own fiscal deficits and incapacity to raise the needed funds for critical infrastructure projects. The long history of deeply embedded state-owned companies, which constitute the primary source of liquidity for the economy, simply means that the local private sector cannot survive on its own, nor provide the financing required to fund mega-infrastructure projects.

Local private sector lacks the technical capacity to deliver PPPs: The merchant families who have traditionally controlled significant sectors in the local economy do not have experience in developing complex infrastructure services. Before the massive infrastructure development Qatar witnessed since the 1990s, these merchant families focused on simple trading in fishery, retail services, and gold. According to a Qatari businessman:

> the economic and urban developments have been so fast that local merchants cannot match its pace with the very limited capacity they have. So, there is no company or merchant or local company that could even build highways, even if you give it to them, they cannot do it.

Therefore, to compensate for the lack of expertise in developing projects, local companies simply play the role of mediators or brokers of government contracts. After they are awarded the project contract, they sub-contract the entire project delivery process to a foreign company. The foreign company hires its own international consultants and its labor to execute the project.

DISCUSSION

The present chapter set out to explore how the macrofoundations of a non-Western society affect the adoption and implementation of a "foreign" organizational form (PPPs) grounded in the institutional orders of Western societies. As our case demonstrates, in Qatari society, as in other Arab countries, the *tribe* provides a powerful inter-institutional system that underpins distinctive instantiations of the institutional orders of the family, the state, and the market. In this section, we highlight the theoretical contributions of our chapter to research on institutional orders in non-Western contexts and the impact of these orders on organizational form adoption, as well as our contributions to research on the influence of the institutional context on the adoption and sustainability of PPPs.

In particular, we highlight two main points of theoretical interest. First, we confirm the fruitfulness of revisiting assumptions about the institutional orders of society in non-Western contexts. We have clearly shown that the tribe remains a key pillar of society in Qatar and the challenge of altering its jurisdictional boundaries. Thus, we emphasize the importance of looking at institutional orders as macrofoundations of institutions to understand how and why organizational forms that are perceived as "foreign" may generate resistance and their adoption be hindered. Second, we note the critical role of institutional factors to complement current research on PPPs and better understand their relative success in different contexts.

The Enduring Influence of the Tribe as an Inter-institutional System and its Influence on the Adoption of Organizational Forms

Our empirical examination of the implementation of PPPs extends current institutional research beyond the Western context to countries that are rarely explored, that is, Arab countries. Our findings reveal that other societies are likely not to share the same assumptions about the relative centrality of some institutional orders over others (e.g., the market) or their relationships (e.g., clear separation and potential collaboration). The case of Qatar illustrates a distinctive configuration of the institutional orders of the family, the state, and the market, where the interests of interconnected actors are intertwined and mutually reinforcing.

Importantly, the inter-institutional system of Qatari society is rooted in the pillar of the tribe; it is through this lens that actors and organizations evaluate and react to novel organizational forms such as PPPs. Our study reveals the underlying mechanisms through which the macrofoundations of this non-Western tribal society affect the implementation of this new form of organizing (Petersen, 2010; Verhoest et al., 2015) and overshadow the efficiency promises of PPPs.

These insights are particularly relevant for institutional scholars because they reveal the importance of considering the culturally contingent nature of institutional orders in examinations of countries that are particularly distant from the Anglo-Saxon tradition. In the case of the implementation of PPPs – a form underpinned by Western logics – in Qatar, it is evident that these organizational forms are "foreign" to local prevailing institutional orders based on tribal logics. Not surprisingly, they trigger adverse reactions and their implementation is both discouraged and challenged.

Our first theoretical insight is a better understanding of how the differences in the macrofoundations of society may be very pronounced between Western and non-Western societies, in particular with large institutional distance (Kostova et al., 2008). Such recognition should alert us to the potential challenge and difficulty of "exporting" Western-based organizational forms to other societies. The premise of collaboration between the public and the private sector is highly promising in contexts where these actors and organizations guided by these orders are clearly separated; however, they present unique challenges in contexts where these conditions do not apply. Notably, the main issues may not reside in the actual implementation of these projects, but in the clashing underlying roots and principles on which these forms are grounded. If we take a closer look at tribal societies in Arab Gulf countries, we can recognize how negotiations and informal pacts among members of the ruling family, government members, and members of merchant families establish a unique governance scheme that reinforces a strict interdependence among the ruling family, the state, and the market. This governance system is designed to maintain the dependence of government officials and merchant families on the largess of the ruling family, which distributes wealth based on loyalty. This unique system is not friendly to public policies and organizational forms that require democratic participation in decision-making or to mechanisms that ensure transparency and accountability of the ruling family.

The peculiarities of Qatari society would be extremely difficult to grasp without a clear understanding of the centrality that the tribe has in the development of this society. Our theorization of the tribe as an inter-institutional system is, therefore, essential, as it advances our understanding of how the relationship between institutional orders may create a distinctive set of logics that guide behavior. The case of Qatar shows how in non-Western societies non-market institutional orders maintains supremacy (e.g., family), and distinctive features of traditionally dominant orders – such as the market – may be altered, based on their relative dependence on a different overarching system (e.g., tribe). For example, rather than competence or value for money, the basis of norms of the market order is closeness to the ruling family; similarly, the source of legitimacy rooted in the state order is not democratic participation – as in Western contexts – but rather distribution of financial resources to citizens. The modification of the distinctive features of institutional orders based on those overarching cultural forces renders the boundaries between institutional orders – such as family and market, state and market, or state and family – more permeable. For example, in contrast to democratic political settings, State actors in Qatar are members of sheikhs' families, influential tribal leaders, and merchants (Crystal, 1995; Khodr, 2014). They collectively design policies and take decisions that "safeguard the interests of the ruling elite" (Ali, 2010, p. 496), wielding substantial influence on how investment laws and policies are designed to protect them from foreign competitors (Oyedele & Firat, 2018). Furthermore, the centrality of decision-making in these closed circles of a few actors renders the reliability of the government's bureaucratic machinery to elaborate effective public policies questionable (Common, 2008).

Appreciating such fundamental and foundational differences at the societal level is imperative to understand the potential and challenges of introducing innovative organizational forms and practices (such as PPPs) that have been designed in (and for) Western contexts. PPPs are a reflection of a society where the market operates with minimum intervention from the state, and where principles of capitalist system supposedly guarantee fair competition in the market (Marsilio et al., 2011). The PPP form, therefore, carries a strong political dimension. It assumes that countries adopting PPPs for infrastructure development believe in democratic values and in the prominent role of the market logic. In a context such as Qatar, however, PPPs represent a threat to the established order and these projects, not surprisingly, are looked at with distrust and suspicion. In societies where the boundaries between the public and private sectors are porous and opaque, innovative partnerships between the public and private sectors are questionable, if not irrelevant. In fact, infrastructure projects are managed under the fundamentally different normative assumption that they serve as a largess-distributing mechanism. The distributary mechanisms of the state keep the segments of society materially satisfied and buy their political acquiescence by a lavish lifestyle and free public and infrastructure services.

Along these lines, we can think of other organizational forms developed in Western contexts that may find a challenging journey when implemented in non-Western context. Similar to PPPs, we suggest that tribal societies would be very skeptical to embrace social entrepreneurship as the attempt to draw upon business techniques and private sector approaches to find solutions to social, cultural, or environmental problems. We encourage future research that will better outline how practices and organizational forms that instantiate the pillars of Western society are received and implemented in non-Western contexts.

The Critical Role of the Institutional Context for the Adoption and Sustainability of PPPs

This chapter also contributes to research on PPPs by probing deeper into the growing understanding that the institutional context affects the implementation of PPPs. This study complements extant research because it reveals the underlying mechanisms through which actors purposefully maintain an institutional context that is, *un*favorable to PPPs. Extant research has revealed how actors promoting PPPs are motivated by efficiency and profit maximization gains (Angerer & Hammerschmid, 2005; Jooste & Scott, 2012a, 2012b; Mahalingam & Delhi, 2012; Verhoest et al., 2015). Scholars have assessed the extent to which legal and regulatory frameworks could facilitate the adoption of PPPs by designing the right incentives for private actors' involvement (Petersen, 2010). The present research, however, shows the opposite process, that is, how opportunistic interests of family, tribe, and state actors could actively overshadow the efficiency promises of PPPs in the local market. As a result, these actors strive to exclude PPP from the government's policy agenda.

Attempting to introduce the PPP form in Qatar and to attract foreign investment for infrastructure would necessitate reforming the legal and regulatory infrastructure, enabling foreign investors' control over their assets and removing conditions for partnering with local businesses. Furthermore, transparency and governance mechanisms related to bidding for contracts would be required to prevent the clientelism and preferential treatment that merchant families have enjoyed for decades. Finally, it would require the modernization of local labor laws and employees' rights, which have attracted heavy criticism from the international community over recent years.

However, adopting the PPP model would entail jeopardizing the interests of the local merchant and ruling families, and enabling foreign investors to drastically reform local regulations. Furthermore, establishing PPPs within an institutional environment of clientelism entails drastically changing the functions of the local bureaucratic state and introducing a wider range of laws and regulatory frameworks that would destabilize the social cohesion among the ruling family, private actors, and citizens. In societies where the bureaucratic state functions primarily as a largess-distributing mechanism, implementing PPPs is, thus, actively resisted. Introducing the PPP model would mean that an established system of patronage would be abolished. Involving foreign investors on a larger scale would entail formalizing decisions within the boundaries of corporate boards and attending to complex governance and transparency requirements that do not reflect local tribal traditions. This contradicts the granting of contracts to the government's favored or closest tribal allies, who consider these contracts to be a legitimate price for their allegiance to the ruling elites, and also their share of the country's oil and gas resources. Therefore, the intimate interdependence among these community and family actors undermines the PPP tool that would increase the market's efficiency, but also eradicate an important source of income through which they both support each other's opportunistic interests.

Thus, whereas political parties in Western countries debate whether a bigger or smaller role of the state in the market strengthens public value (Savas, 2000) and then propose PPPs as an organizational form capable of energizing the private sector's role in society (Petersen, 2010), the case of Qatar suggests that this may be a strenuous challenge, as it requires a radical cultural change in the societal inter-institutional system.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter highlights the critical role that institutional orders have in preventing the broader adoption of infrastructure PPPs in Qatar. By revealing the intricate relationships among state, family, and market actors in this country, we offer an analysis that sharply contrasts with the assumptions in the Western literature about the supremacy of the market and the search for organizational efficiency as a primary goal. We shed light on the importance of non-market institutional orders in non-Western settings and show how the macrofoundations of society shape the implementation of an innovative organizational form in a rather different way than presented in the literature. We renew the call for testing our theoretical assumptions beyond Western contexts, to generate original insights about the role of macrofoundations in determining individual and organizational actions.

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